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HAGUE CONVENTION ON TAKING EVIDENCE
ABROAD-FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-
DISCOVERY-The United States Supreme Court has
held that the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters
provides optional procedures for conducting
discovery in a foreign nation to which American
courts may resort if, after a particularized comity
analysis, they deem it necessary.
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
The petitioners, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale and
Societe de Construction d'Avions de Tourism, are French corpora-
tions owned by the Republic of France' and are engaged in the
business of designing, manufacturing and distributing airplanes. 2 On
August 19, 1980 a plane produced by the petitioners3 crashed in New
Virginia, Iowa resulting in injuries to the plaintiffs, Dennis Jones,
John George, and Rosa George.4 Each plaintiff filed suit advancing
theories of negligence, strict products liability and breach of war-
ranty.5 All three actions were consolidated in the district court6 and,
with the parties' consent, were referred to a magistrate pursuant to
1. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987). "Petitioner Societe de
Construction d'Avions de Tourism is a wholly owned subsidiary of Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale." Id. at 2546 n.2.
2. Id. at 2546.
3. Id. The plane, marketed by the name "Rallye" had been advertised in
American aviation magazines as the "World's safest and most economical STOL
[short take-off and landing] plane." Id.
4. In Re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 122 (8th
Cir. 1986). "Although the district court is the nominal respondent in this mandamus
proceeding, plaintiffs are the real parties in interest." 107 S. Ct. at 2546 n.5.
5. Brief for Respondent and Real Parties in Interest at 2, Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
6. 782 F.2d at 122.
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federal law.' In August of 1983 the plaintiffs served their first request
for the production of documents' to which the petitioners responded,
at least to the extent that the requested documents were in the United
States. 9 Plaintiffs served interrogatories, additional requests for pro-
duction and admissions to which the petitioners responded with a
motion for a protective order. 0
The French corporations based their contention on the applicability
of the Multilateral Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil and Commercial Matters (Hague Convention)." Petitioners
first asserted that since the information sought was located in France,
the Hague Convention, and not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
must control the plaintiffs' discovery attempts. 12 Invoking French
law, 3 the petitioners argued that they could not comply with the
request under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without subjecting
7. 107 S. Ct. at 2546. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) provides:
Not withstanding any provision of law to the contrary-(l) Upon consent of
the parties, a full-time United States magistrate or part-time United States
magistrate who serves as a full-time judicial officer may conduct any or all
proceedings in a jury or non-jury civil matter and order the entry of judgment
in the case, when specifically designated to excercise such jurisdiction by the
district court or courts he serves.
8. Brief for the Respondent and Real Parties in Interest at 2. Plaintiffs
sought production of the pilot's handbook and flight manual as well as performance
data and testing records of the plane involved. Id.
9. 107 S. Ct. at 2546 n.4.
10. 782 F.2d at 123.
11. Opened for signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No.
7444. "The United States, the Republic of France, and 15 other nations have acceded
to the Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial
Matters .... This Convention-sometimes referred to as the 'Hague Convention'
or the 'Evidence Convention'-prescribes certain procedures by which a judicial
authority in one contracting State may request evidence located in another contracting
State." 107 S. Ct. at 2545.
12. 782 F.2d at 123.
13. French Penal Code Law No. 80-538 reads:
Article IA. Subject to treaties and international agreements and applicable
laws and regulations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose,
in writing, orally or otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or
technical documents or information leading to the constitution of evidence
with a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or in connection
therewith ....
Article 2. The parties mentioned in Articles 1 and IA shall forthwith inform
the competent minister if they receive any request concerning such disclosures
Article 3. Without prejudice to heavier penalties prescribed by law, any breach
of Articles 1 and IA of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment for two
to six months and a fine of 10,000 to 120,000 or either.
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themselves to criminal liability in France. 4 Petitioners concluded that
the applicability of the French Blocking Statute required that the
plaintiffs' discovery proceed exclusively in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Hague Convention. 5 The plaintiffs contended that
since the court had obtained in personam jurisdiction over the
petitioners, the applicability of the Hague Convention was nullified. 6
Additionally, they argued that the interpretation ascribed to the
Convention by the courts of this country rendered its procedures
inapplicable to discovery situations in which evidence was not to be
taken in a foreign nation. 7
In reviewing the petitioners' motion the magistrate relied heavily
upon the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
In re Anschuetz & Co.'8 and denied the protective order. 9 The
magistrate noted that the Hague Convention and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure must both be enforced in the absence of a direct
conflict 2° and acknowledged that principles of international comity
must be taken into account. 2' Recognizing that, if applied, the French
Blocking Statute would compel the use of the Convention procedures,
the magistrate ruled that an American court may order any party
who is subject to its jurisdiction to comply with discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 22 In justifying this conclusion he
stated:
14. 782 F.2d at 123.
15. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18a.
16. Id. at 12a.
17. Id. at 16a.
18. 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985). In this case, an action was brought as a
result of a collision between several boats. The defendant, a foreign company,
sought a protective order on grounds similar to those profferred in this case. The
Fifth Circuit held that the Hague Convention is not applicable to the production of
evidence in this country by a party subject to the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 615.
19. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 25a. The magistrate ordered discovery
as follows:
1) Defendant shall answer the interrogatories propounded by the plaintiffs
and respond to plaintiffs' request for admissions and for production of
documents on or before October 1, 1985.
2) If discovery depositions are to be undertaken, the court will require
compliance with the Hague Evidence Convention if such depositions are to
be taken in France, based on the court's understanding of the current law.
Id.
20. Id. at 18a.
21. Id. at 16a.
22. Id. at 17a. The magistrate held, "A finding that the production of
documents is precluded by foreign law does not conclude a discovery dispute. A
United States court has the power to order any party within its jurisdiction to testify
or produce documents regardless of a foreign sovereign's views to the contrary."
Id.
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Treaties should be construed so as to effect their purposes . . . , and
to be as consistent, insofar as possible, with coexisting statutes ....
The goal of the Hague Convention was to facilitate and increase the
exchange of information between nations. It would not serve this goal
to transform its provisions into a means to frustrate the discovery
process. We conclude, therefore, that this. court is not required to
defer to the the French Statute by virtue of the Hague Convention. 2
Further, the magistrate adopted the view of the court in Graco v.
Kremlin, Inc.24 that the Convention was inapplicable because the
discovery did not require any proceedings to be conducted in France.25
Furthermore, if the treaty were to be applied it would produce the
undesirable results of involving two judicial systems in the lawsuit,2 6
thereby increasing the likelihood of disrupting international relations2 7
and compelling American courts to surrender jurisdiction. 2  In
addressing the petitioners' argument that they would be subjected to
criminal sanctions in France if they were to produce the requested
information, the magistrate noted that the purpose of the French
Blocking Statute was to impede the enforcement of United States
Anti-Trust laws29 and there were no indications that it was intended
to affect litigation preparations.3 0 Applying Soletanche and Rodio,
Inc. v. Brown and Lambrecht Earth Movers, Inc.,3" the magistrate
23. Id. at 18a (citations ommitted).
24. 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. I1. 1984). During discovery in an action for patent
infringement the French defendant invoked the Hague Convention to support a
motion for a protective order. The court held that discovery does not take place
abroad merely because the information is located in a foreign country. Id. at 521.
25. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21a.
26. Id.
27. Id. Quoting Graco the magistrate stated, "Trying (or pre- trying) a case
in two different countries' courts is not a desirable way of handling routine litigation.
Involving two judicial systems in a single lawsuit is as likely to disrupt internationalrelations as it is to promote them, especially when the two systems are brought
together for discovery purposes." Id.
28. Id. Again quoting Graco, the magistrate added, "Either American courts
would surrender jurisdiction by treating the decisions of foreign authorities as final
and unreviewable, or they would invite endless motions and real international friction
by second-guessing those decisions." Id.
29. Id. at 22a.
30. Id. at 23a.
31. •99 F.R.D. 269 (N.D. Ill. 1983). In a suit for patent infringement a French
plaintiff argued that compliance with a discovery request would subject it to liability
under French Penal Code Law No. 80-538. The court held that the possibility of
criminal liabilty does not automatically bar a court from ordering discovery, but
that a court must balance the interests of both sides, considering the interests of
each State, the nature and extent of the hardship on the party' the extent to which
discovery is to occur in another nation, and the effectiveness of enforcement in
acheiving compliance. Petiton for a Writ of Certiorari at 23a.
[Vol. 26:773
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balanced the interests of France and the risks to the petitioners
against the interests of the United States,32 thus concluding that
American interests should prevail.33
Upon this initial defeat, the petitioners applied to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for a writ of mandamus.
3 4
Embracing the Fifth Circuit's rationale in Anschuetz, the court held
the better rule to be that the Hague Convention does not apply to
the production of evidence which is in the possession of a foreign
litigant over whom the court has jurisdiction, even if the evidence
sought is in a foreign nation. 5 The foreign corporations argued that
principles of international comity required, at the very least that
resort must first be made to the procedures of the Hague Convention,
and that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be used as a back-up
should the Hague procedures fail.36 In rejecting this argument the
court, again adopting the views expressed in Anschuetz, held that to
allow a foreign court to rule on an issue only to have an American
court override its decision would be a tremendous insult to the
nation's sovereignty3 7 as well as a defeat for the principles of inter-
national comity.3"
In reviewing the magistrates ruling regarding the French Blocking
Statute, the court of appeals applied a two-step analysis.3 9 First, the
32. Petition for a Writ of Certioari at 23a-24a. The magistrate summed the
intersts involved as follows:
The vital national interest in this case is protection of United States citizens
from harmful foreign products and compensation for injuries caused by such
products. France's interest is protection of their citizens from intrusive foreign
discovery procedures; however, it does not appear that France has strictly
enforced the law. Defendants face no extraordinary hardship at this point
.... The required conduct does not have to take place in France ....
Id.
33. Id. at 25a. The magistrate stated: "To permit the Hague Evidence
Convention to override the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would frustrate the
courts' interests, which particularly arise in products liability cases .... As to
defendants' argument of illegality, this Court determines that the United States
interests are stronger than potential French interests, given no strong evidence that
Law No. 80-538 is strictly enforced." Id.
34. 782 F.2d at 120. The court noted that mandamus review of interlocutory
discovery orders is limited, but would be allowed in this case because of the novelty,
importance, and likely recurrence of the problem presented. Id.
35. Id. at 124.
36. Id. at 125.
37. Id. at 125-26. Quoting In re Anschuetz the court stated, "[T]he greatest
insult to a civil law country's sovereignty would be for American courts to invoke
the foreign country's judicial aid merely as a first resort, subject to the eventual
override of their rulings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id.
38. Id. at 126.
39. Id.
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court examined whether the magistrate was correct in ordering the
petitioners to comply with the discovery request.4 After affirming
the magistrate's decision, 4' the court examined whether sanctions
could be imposed upon the foreign litigants for failure to comply.
42
While acknowledging that the petitioners' good faith attempts at
compliance should be considered in determining any sanctions which
would be imposed,43 the court concluded that the issue was not yet
ripe for determination,
The most interesting aspect of the court of appeals' opinion is
found in its response to the petitioners' argument that enforcing the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this case would render the Hague
Convention meaningless. Seizing a passage from Graco,45 the court
noted, "the Hague Convention will continue to provide useful, if
not mandatory, procedures for discovery abroad from foreign non-
parties who are not subject to an American court's jurisdiction and
compulsory powers.' '
The United States Supreme Court granted the petitioners' request
for a writ of certiorari on June 9, 1986.47 The issue on appeal was
to what extent a federal court must apply the procedures of the
Hague Convention when a litigant seeks discovery from a foreign
adversary over whom the court has jurisdiction."u Justice Stevens,
40. Id.
41. Id. The court stated, "The magistrate properly recognized that '[t]he fact
that foreign law may subject a person to criminal sanctions in the foreign country
if he produces certain information does not automatically bar a domestic court from
compelling production.' Id. (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 127.
43. Id.
44. Id. The court determined:
The record before this court does not indicate whether the petitioners have
notified the appropriate French Minister of the requested discovery in accor-
dance with Article 2 of the French Blocking Statute, or whether the petitioners
have attempted to secure a waiver of prosecution from the French government
.... [T]hese issues will only be relevant should the petitioners fail to comply
with the magistrate's discovery order, and we need not presently address them.
Id.
45. Id. at 125. The court in Graco had said: "Two important purposes of
an international convention of this type relate to discovery of non-parties, and
would justify the Convention's existence regardless of how the Convention is deemed
to apply with respect to parties before the court." 101 F.R.D. at 520.
46. 782 F.2d at 125 (emphasis added).
47. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa, U.S. , 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986).
48. 107 S. Ct. at 2546.
[Vol. 26:773
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speaking for a divided Court, 49 affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals in part and reversed it in part.50 In affirming the lower
court's opinion, the majority found that interpreting the Hague
Convention as the exclusive means for conducting foreign discovery
or requiring litigants to make mandatory first resort to the treaty's
procedures would be inconsistent with the language and negotiating
history of the document." To support its decision of non-exclusivity
the Court found the following facts significant: the absence of
mandatory language in the preamble of the Convention; 2 the fact
that Article 23 of the Convention allows a foreign nation to refuse
to execute Letters of Request;53 and, that Article 27 allows a signatory
state to provide more liberal procedures for obtaining evidence than
those authorized by the Convention.5 4 Further, the majority reasoned
that a rule of exclusivity of the Convention's procedures would
49. Id. at 2542. Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Powell and Scalia. Justice Blackmun joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and O'Connor concurred only as to the Convention's non-exclusivity and
applicabiltiy to parties under the Court's jurisdiction. Id. at 2545.
50. Id. at 2548. The majority affirmed the court of appeals finding that the
Hague Convention did not provide the exclusive means of discovery, id., but reversed
its finding that the treaty was applicable only to discovery sought from non-litigant
witnesses over whom the court had no jurisdiction. Id. at 2554.
51. Id. at 2550.
52. Id. The Preamble to the Hague Convention states:
The States signatory to the present Convention, [diesiring to facilitate the
transmission and execution of Letters of Request and to further the accomo-
dation of different methods which they use for this purpose, [djesiring to
improve mutual judicial co-operation in civil or commercial matters, [hiave
resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect and have agreed upon the
following provisions- .
23 U.S.T. at 2557.
53. 107 S. Ct. at 2552. Article 23 of the Hague Convention provides:
A contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession,
declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of
obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law coun-
tries.
23 U.S.T. at 2568.
54. 107 S. Ct. at 2552. Article 27 of the Hague Convention provides:
The provisions of the present convention shall not prevent a contracting State
from- .
(b) permitting, by internal law or practice, any act provided for in this
Convention to be performed upon less restrictive conditions;
(c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other
than those provided for in this Convention.
23 U.S.T. at 2569.
The Court also noted the use of "may" in Articles 1, 15, 16, and 17. 107 S. Ct.
at 2551.
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subject American courts to the internal laws of foreign States" and
create what the court referred to as "three unacceptable asymme-
tries".
5 6
In rejecting a rule of mandatory first resort, Justice Stevens de-
clined acceptance of the lower court's theory that the possible over-
riding of a foreign court's decision would be an insult to that nation's
sovereignty, reasoning foreign courts must recognize the final decision
on such discovery matters rests with American courts . 7 The major-
ity's decision was based instead upon a recognition that the Conven-
tion's procedures could be overly expensive and slow, 8 less likely to
produce results, 9 and inconsistent with American judicial interests in
the inexpensive and speedy determination of issuesA6
The majority noted that a third interpretation of the Hague Con-
vention could be that its procedures are optional, but that interna-
tional comity requires they be attempted first. 61 The Court rejected
this possibility, holding that if any such duty existed, it should have
been clearly described in the treaty. 62 The majority, however, did not
55. Id. at 2553.
56. Id. n.25. Justice Stevens reasoned:
The opposite conclusion would create three unacceptible asymmetries. First,
within any lawsuit between a national of the United States and a national of
another contracting party, the foreign party would obtain discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while the domestic party would be required
to resort first to the procedures of the Hague Convention .... Second, a
rule of exclusivity would enable a company which is a citizen of another
contracting State to compete with a domestic company on uneven terms, since
a foreign company would be subject to less extensive discovery procedures in
the event that both companies were sued in an American court .... Third,
since a rule of first use of the Hague Convention would apply in cases in
which a foreign party is a national of a contracting State, but not to cases
where a foreign party is a national of any other foreign State, the rule would
confer an unwarranted advantage on some domestic litigants over others
similarly situated.
Id.
57. Id. at 2554-55.
58. Id. at 2555.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Court stated:
In many situations the Letter of Request procedure authorized by the Con-
vention would be unduly time consuming and expensive, as well as less certain
to produce the needed evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules. A rule
of first resort in all cases would therefore be inconsistent with the overriding
interest in the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of litigation in
our courts.
Id. (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 2550.
62. Id. at 2554-55.
[Vol. 26:773
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completely ignore the principles of comity and ultimately held that
the Hague Convention provides optional procedures for obtaining
evidence from a litigant or any witness 63 any time a court may deem
such a course appropriate after applying a particularized comity
analysis." Specifically this analysis takes into account: the particular
facts of each case; the sovereigns' interests; the likelihood that the
Hague procedures will be successful; 65 and the burdensome or intru-
sive character of the discovery sought. 66
While agreeing with the majority that the Hague Convention did
not provide the exclusive means for conducting discovery abroad,
67
and that it extended to discovery sought from litigants as well as
non-party witnesses, 6 Justice Blackmun strongly disagreed with the
majority's adoption of a case-by-case comity analysis and the Court's
failure to provide an adequate standard to aid the lower courts in
the analysis. 69 The minority reasoned that the purpose of the Con-
63. Id. at 2554.
64. Id. at 2555. Other factors the Court considered relevant include:
1) The importance to the litigation of the documents or other information
requested;
2) The degree of specificity of the request;
3) Whether the information originated in the United States;
4) The availability of alternative means of securing the information; and
5) The extent to which non-compliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the State where the information is located.
Id.
65. Id. at 2556.
66. Id. at 2557. The Court held the French Blocking Statute was not binding
upon American courts, but was "relevant to the court's particularized comity analysis
only to the extent that its terms and its enforcement identify the sovereign's interest
in nondisclosure." Id. at 2556 n.29.
67. Id. at 2558.
68. Id. The dissent also agreed that no distinction should be made between
evidence located "abroad" and that within the possession or control of the litigants.
Id.
69. Id. Justice Blackmun stated:
Some might well regard the Court's decision as an affront to the nations that
have joined the United States in ratifying the Hague Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters [citation ommitted].
The Court ignores the importance of the Convention by relegating it to an
"optional" status, without acknowledging the significant achievement in ac-
comodating divergent interests that the Convention represents. Experience to
date indicates that there is a large risk that the case-by- case comity analysis
now to be permitted by the Court will be performed inadequately and that
the somewhat unfamiliar procedures of the Convention will be invoked infre-
quently. I fear the Court's decision means that courts will resort unnecessarily
to issuing discovery orders under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a
1988]
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vention was to eliminate the conflicts which arose as the result of
great differences between United States discovery procedures and the
judicially conducted discovery of civil law nations. 70 Further, the
dissent noted, at the time the treaty was signed foreign nations
already enjoyed the informality of discovery under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 7' and had nothing to gain by signing the Hague
Convention if its provisions were to be optional. 7
2
Justice Blackmun's opinion attacked the majority's balancing test
on the grounds that unlike usual discovery questions, international
discovery required the courts to weigh and determine foreign inter-
ests-a task they are not equipped to do. 73 Additionally, the dissent
determined that the Hague Convention represented a political bal-
ancing of sovereign interests which should not be questioned. 74 Fi-
nally, the minority argued, the balancing test was susceptible to a
pro-forum bias, 75 and, since appellate review of interlocutory orders
is limited, it is unlikely errors will be corrected. 76 The minority also
questioned Justice Stevens' reading of Article 27 of the Convention,
arguing that it could only be read as applying to the nation receiving
a discovery request. 77 The dissent further accused the majority of
raw exercise of their jurisdictional power to the detriment of the United States'
national and international interests.
Id. at 2557-58.
70. Id. at 2558-59.
71. Id. at 2559. The minority opinion stated: "In 1964 Rule 28(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781 and 1782 were amended
to offer foreign countries and litigants, without a requirement of reciprocity, wide
judicial assistance on a unilateral basis for the obtaining of evidence in the United
States." Id. at 2548 n.13.
72. Id. at 2559.
73. Id. at 2559-60. Noting that the majority had incompletely analyzed the
interests of foreign nations, Justice Blackmun, quoted Chief Justice Marshall in The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136 (1812):
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute .... Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external
source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the
restriction ....
All' exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation
itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.
Id. at 2562 n.12.
.74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2561.
77. Id. at 2559. Justice Blackmun contended:
The majority finds plausible a reading that authorizes both a requesting and
a receiving State to use methods outside the Convention. If this were the case,
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overstating the effect of the restrictions executed pursuant to Article
23.78 Furthermore, the minority argued that Article 9 was designed
to protect the sovereign interests of foreign nations79 which it believed
the majority had incompletely analyzed. 0
The dissenters stopped short of proposing that a litigant be required
to utilize the provisions of the Hague Convention as a first resort, 1
but concluded there should be a general presumption favoring its
uses2 unless there were strong reasons to believe that the Conventions
procedures would be unsuccessful.83 In those cases where the treaty
could not resolve a particular conflict, a comity analysis would have
to be utilized.84 However, in most cases, such analysis would be
unnecessary because the Hague Convention is the result of the
political application of very same comity principles.85
Article 27(c), which allows a State to permit methods of taking evidence that
are not provided in the Convention, would make the rest of the Convention
wholly superfluous. If a requesting State could dictate the methods for taking
evidence in another State, there would be no need for the detailed procedures
provided by the Convention.
Id. at 2559 n.2.
78. Id. at 2565-66.
79. Id. at 2564.
80. Id. at 2562. Stated Justice Blackmun:
I am encouraged by the extent to which the Court emphasizes the importance
of foreign interests and by its admonition to lower courts to take special care
to respect those interests. Nonetheless, the Court's view of the Convention
rests on an incomplete analysis of the sovereign interests of foreign States.
The Court acknowledges that evidence is normally obtained in civil-law coun-
tries by a judicial officer, but it fails to recognize the significance of that
practice. Under the classic view of territorial sovereignty, each State has a
monopoly on the exercise of governmental power within its borders and no
State may perform an act in the territory of a foreign State without consent.
Id. (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 2567.
82. Id. at 2568.
83. Id. at 2567. Justice Blackmun described his standard as follows:
The approach I propose is not a rigid per se rule that would require first use
of the Convention without regard to strong indications that no evidence would
be forthcoming. All to often, however, courts have simply assumed that resort
to the Convention would be unproductive and have embarked on speculation
about foreign procedures and interpretations. When resort to the Convention
would be futile, a court has no choice but to resort to a traditional comity
analysis. But even then, an attempt to use the Convention will often be the
best way to discover if it will be successful, particularly in the present state
of general inexperience with the implementation of its procedures by the
various contracting States.
Id. (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 2562.
85. Id.
1988]
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The Hague Convention entered into force with respect to the United
States on October 7, 1972. Its espoused purpose was to span the
differences between common law and civil law methods of obtaining
evidence by providing procedures that would be "tolerable" in the
country where the evidence was to be taken while producing infor-
mation that was "utilizable" in the courts of the forum nation.16
The treaty received the wide-spread support of numerous legal or-
ganizations and was unanimously ratified by Congress.17 This over-
whelming support may be considered the result of difficulties and
perils associated with international discovery prior to its promulga-
tion. Necessarily, a complete understanding of the Convention must
begin with an examination of international discovery before 1972.
The first method of obtaining evidence abroad was the Letter
Rogatory, which requested a foreign court to take evidence from
specified witnesses.88 This procedure was never viewed favorably for
several reasons. The first was that the Letters Rogatory traveled
through diplomatic channels which were often slow, inefficient, and
costly.8 9 Additionally, the evidence was taken in accordance with the
procedures of the foreign nation and was usually inadmissible in
American courts2 ° It was also quite possible that the time, effort,
and money expended would be a wasteful exercise in futility because
many foreign courts refused to compel unwilling witnesses to provide
evidence. 9' -Faced with the difficulties of Letters Rogatory and the
86. Report of the United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, 8 Int'l Legal Materials 785, 806
(1969). Taking evidence abroad had long been a concern because of the "marked
differences between common law and civil law concepts and methods of taking
evidence. Some countries [had] insisted on the exclusive use of the complicated,
dilatory and expensive system of Letters Rogatory or Letters of Request. Other
countries have refused adequate judicial assistance because of the absence of a treaty
or convention with the United States." Amram, The Proposed Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A.J. 651, 651 (1969).
87. 107 S. Ct at 2549. The Hague Convention was supported by the American
Bar Association, the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws,
the Judicial Conference of the United States, and a number of various state and
local bar associations. Id.
88. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program
for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 519 (1953).
89. Id. at 529.
90. Id. at 519. In 1964 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b) and the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781 and 1782 were amended to allow foreign litigants
the benefits of the federal rules without a requirement of reciprocity. Amram, supra
note 86, at 651.
91. Jones, supra note 88, at 521; see also, Smit, International Aspects of
Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. Rv. 1031, 1054 (1961).
[Vol. 26:773
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high probability of their failure, most American attorneys chose
instead to use the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b)
which provides three ways by which depositions may be taken ia a
foreign country. 92 This approach, although preferrable because it did
not involve the judiciary of a foreign nation or diplomatic channels, 9?
had serious limitations. The first limitation was that the production
of documents was not allowed under Rule 28(b). 94 A second limitation
was that, although parties to the litigation could be compelled to
testify, American courts lack the power to compel a non-cooperative
third party who is not a national or a resident of the United States
to testify. 95 However, the most serious impediment to the use of the
provisions of the Federal Rules is that they are completely inoperable
unless the country in which discovery is sought allows their use.
96
The possible hazards presented by this were increased by the fact
that federal and state rules did not warn the practioners that these
procedures could be used "only if and as foreign law permits".
97
92. Prior to 1964, Rule 28(b) provided:
In a foreign State or country, depositions shall be taken (1) on notice before
a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent of the United States, or (2) before such person or officer as
may be appointed by commission, or (3) under letters rogatory. A commission
or letters rogatory shall be issued only when necessary or convenient, on
application and notice, and on such terms and with such directions as are just
and appropriate. Officers may be designated in notices or commissions either
by name or descriptive title and letters rogatory may be addressed "To the
Appropriate Judicial Authority in [here name the country].
In 1964 the rule was amended to liberalize its methods of obtaining evidence and
to lessen the requirements necessary to the admissibility of evidence obtained through
its procedures. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) advisory committee's note.
93. Jones, supra note 88, at 519.
94. Smit, supra note 91, at 1053. For an exception to this rule see note 95
infra.
95. Smit, supra note 91, at 1053. A United States resident or citizen abroad
may be compelled by subpeona to testify or produce documents under 28 U.S.C. §
1783. Carter, Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 INT'L LAw. 5, 8 n.6 (1979). In the
case of a non-cooperating third party witness not coming within the provisions of
§ 1783 compulsion could only emanate from a foreign court pursuant to a letter
rogatory. Smit, supra note 91, at 1054.
96. Carter, supra note 95, at 13. Specifically Carter stated, "The authoriza-
tions of Federal Rule 28(b) are meaningless if they cannot be matched with a right
to act in the specific foreign nation in question." Id. Depositions may often require
a determination of foreign law and procedure which can be very expensive and time
consuming. Jones, supra note 88, at 522-23.
97. Jones, supra note 88, at 519. In 1963 the Advisory Committee Note to
FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) was amended to include the following warning:
Some foreign countries are hostile to allowing a deposition to be taken in
their country, especially by notice or commission, or to lending assistance to
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This conflict between American and foreign law has spawned what
has become known as "legal tourism"-a surreptitious gathering of
evidence by one not authorized to carry out such a judicial act in a
foreign civil law country. 98 Legal tours are often engaged in for
purposes of conducting sweeping and unguided discovery. 99 Although
foreign nations have seldom taken steps to curb such activity, risks
do inhere in it. A legal tourist may find himself facing criminal
prosecution in a civil law country for usurping a judicial function.I°°
Additionally, he may find that the souvenirs of his tour will be
successfully precluded from admittance into evidence' °1 or ultimately,
that he holds an unenforceable judgment. 0 2 Some may find justifi-
cation for the activity in the laxity of foreign attempts to curtail
legal tourism, however, such attendant risks should never be com-
pletely overlooked. 13
With this perception of the time, expense and dangers involved in
international discovery before the Hague Convention, it is not sur-
prising that the treaty received wide-spread support in this country.
the taking of a deposition. Thus compliance with the terms of amended
subdivision (b) may not in all cases ensure completion of discovery abroad.
Examination of the law and policy of the particular foreign country in advance
of attempting a deposition is therefore advisable.
FED. R. Crv. P. 28(b) advisory committee note.
98. Borel & Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in
France for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAw. 35, 35 (1979).
99. Id. at 45.
100. Id. Borel & Boyd contend:
These irregular practices are known to French Authorities who, so far,
have taken no action to limit them. However, such practices involve certain
risks to which attention should be drawn .... The French Minister of Justice
could decide that the lawyers involved, deemed to be without any lawful
authority to engage in such acts, would be subject to criminal proceedings in
France. Such a proceeding may be brought under Article 258 of the Penal
Code which imposes a punishment of two to five years imprisonment for
anyone who, without lawful authority, interferes with public, civil or military
functions. To date, no prosecution of this type has ever been undertaken.
Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. A foreign court may deny enforcement because the judgment was
rendered on evidence obtained in violation of the nation's public policy. Id.
103. Jones, supra note 88, at 520-21. United States courts and litigants often
incorrectly assume that American procedures can be projected into foreign nations
and that testimony may be taken at will. In 1949 three Dutch lawyers were imprisoned
in Switzerland, charged with usurping the sovereign functions of the Swiss Govern-
ment and "economic espionage" as a result of conducting depositions. Their release
was finally obtained only after an official apology was made by the Dutch Govern-
ment. Shortly after this, American courts ordered commissions for depositions in
Switzerland without any realization of the danger. Id.
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The Hague Convention was intended to "bridge the gap" between
the judicially conducted discovery of civil law nations and the pri-
vately conducted discovery of common law nations.1°4 The corner-
stones of the document were "accomodation" and "cooperation" in
international discovery. 105 The negotiating history of the treaty shows
that its drafters proceeded with a keen eye toward the protection of
judicial sovereignty,' °6 to establish a set of minimum standards for
assistance in conducting international discovery. 107The treaty provides
that evidence may be taken through Letters of Request'08 or by
diplomatic officers or commissioners,' °9 but its history does not
indicate whether it is to provide mandatory procedures for use in
obtaining evidence abroad."10
By placing the Hague Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure within their proper historical context, the flaws in the
majority's reasoning in Societe Nationale become more apparent.
Initially, there are indications that the majority may have an incorrect
perception of the history of international discovery."' It appears that
the silent tolerance of American discovery procedures by civil law
nations has led many to incorrectly presume that these procedures
104. See, e.g., Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 86, at 806.
105. Preamble to the Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad, 23
U.S.T. at 2557.
106. Report of the United States Delegation, 8 Int'l Legal Materials, at 806.
107. Id. at 808. The United States Delegation noted:
While the proposed Convention provides a substantial number of im-
provements over existing practice, it is most important to emphasize that the
Convention is designed to set minimum standards for international assistance.
Any country may unilaterally offer by internal law and practice, wider,
broader, more liberal and less restrictive international assistance.
Id.
108. Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad, Articles 1-14, 23 U.S.T.
at 2557-64.
109. Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad, Articles 15-22, 23 U.S.T.
at 2564-68.
110. Report on the Second Meeting of the Special Commission on the Oper-
ation of the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters, reprinted in, 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1668, 1678
(1985). Although an attempt was made by the delegates at the meeting to resolve
the issue of whether the treaty's provisions should be considered exclusive no
agreement could be reached. Id.
111. 107 S. Ct. at 2551 n. 16. The majority noted, "At the time the Convention
was drafted, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b) clearly authorized the taking of
evidence on notice either in accordance with the laws of the foreign country or in
pursuance of the law of the United States." Id. The Court also refers to the "broad
discovery powers" American courts enjoyed prior to the Hague Convention. Id. at
2552.
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have been openly embraced.11 2 This overstatement of American ju-
dicial interests has a severe impact upon the final results reached
under the Court's particularized comity analysis. It inflates American
sovereign interests while down-playing the sovereign interests of a
foreign nation, and, in essence, creates the pro-forum bias of which
Justice Blackmun warned. This inaccurate perception is also a con-
tributing factor to the majority's incorrect construction of Article
23113 of the Convention.'
1 4
The majority finds further support for its position by construing
Article 27 "1 to apply to both the requesting and receiving nations." 6
The history of the Hague Convention provides strong evidence to
suggest that this interpretation is incorrect:
[S]tudies had made clear that no country could be expected to
abandon its historical method of taking evidence and its local practice
and procedure. What should be asked was that a country agree, in
international litigation, to follow as closely as possible the practice
and procedure of the requesting State, in order that the evidence might
be taken in a manner which most closely approached the technique.of
the forum where the action was pending. 117
112. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 56a. The French Consul in the United
States has stated:
[R]ecall first that international judicial assistance can take place only with
respect for the sovereignty of each State and particularly for the principle of
the territoriality of laws, and consequently for a judicial authority of one
State to demand the production of documents or information that are under
the jurisdiction of a foreign State, without its authorization and without
respecting the procedures in force in that State, would constitute under
international law an infringement of the sovereignty of that State.
Id.
113. See supra note 53.
114. 107 S. Ct. at 2552. The majority held that the treaty could not be
exclusive in part because Article 23 allowed foreign nations the right to refuse to
execute Letters of Request for "pre-trial" discovery. Id. Subsequent delegations
concerning the treaty have found that the term "pre-trial" is understood in many
countries as meaning "before the inititation of a lawsuit." Id. at 2565-66 n.21.
Such language difficulties were anticipated by the drafters of the Convention:
[E]ach language has special words of art perfectly clear to the lawyers
and judges who employ that language, but which can be reproduced in another
language only by using a circumlocution or by using that language's special
terms of art. Also, in one language a single word may clearly define a legal
concept which if "translated" into a single word of another language would
be totally misleading and wrong.
Report of the United States Delegation, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, at 805.
115. See supra note 54.
116. 107 S. Ct. at 2552-53 n.4.
117. Report of the United States Delegation, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIUALS, at
806. See also Amram, 55 A.B.A.J. at 655.
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Other evidence contradicting the majority's view includes the ex-
pressed desire to preserve those aspects of a receiving nations internal
law that are favorable to foreign litigants and the importance of not
rendering the treaty superfluous."'
Justice Stevens' opinion is also guided by his concerns of creating
"three unnacceptable asymmetries"." 9 Though persuasive at first
glimpse, a closer analysis shows these concerns to be of far less
importance than the majority presumes. The first of these asymme-
tries is virtually rendered a nullity when it is recalled that the
procedures of the Federal Rules were made available to foreign
litigants without a requirement of reciprocity as early as 1964,120
while American litigants were left to conduct their discovery on the
ever-shifting winds of international comity. Early in its opinion, the
Court noted that a motivating force behind the Hague Convention
was the desire to improve procedures for international discovery,' 2'
however, here the treaty was viewed as imposing a penalty upon
American parties.
The Court's second asymmetry deals with the desire that both
foreign and domestic companies compete on an equal basis. While
it is not clear that the extent of discovery procedures truly creates a
competitive edge for a foreign corporation in the marketplace, if it
is assumed that it does, there is still little reason to believe that this
justifies the derogation of the Hague Convention to an optional
status. A judge may use his discretionary powers to control discovery
and promote fairness 2 2 and, as will be discussed more fully below,
the treaty contains provisions allowing a party to r\equest the use of
special procedures.
The majority's third asymmetry most clearly displays the Court's
erroneous view of the history of international discovery. In stating
that a litigant dealing with a foreign party from a nion-contracting
nation is in a more favorable position than a litigant 6lealing with a
contracting nation the Court misperceives the purpose of the Hague
Convention2 3 and overstates the international applicability of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In actuality it is the litigant seeking
118. 107 S. Ct. at 2559 n.2.
119. See supra note 56.
120. Amram, 55 A.B.A.J. at 651.
121. 107 S. Ct. at 2548.
122. Id. at 2567.
123. Id.
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discovery from a noncontracting State that is disadvantaged by the
absence of the treaty's procedures.
24
The majority of the Court also appears to be of the opinion that
the use of the Convention would "subordinate the Court's supervision
of even the most routine of these pretrial proceedings to the actions
or, equally, to the inactions of foreign judicial authorities."'' 25 This
presumption is not necessarily true, however. Article 9 of the Hague
Convention allows a requesting court to specify any special methods
or procedures it would like the court of execution to use. 126 Article
10 guarantees that a certain amount of compulsion will be used by
a foreign State to execute the request.1 27 Under the wording of Article
10 it may, nonetheless, be possible for the courts of a foreign nation
to refuse to execute a Letter of Request. Under the provisions of
Article 5 of the treaty the reasons for refusing to execute the Letter
of Request must be specified and communicated to the requesting
State.121 It is only in these instances of a failure in the Convention's
procedures that a comity analysis conducted by the requesting State
may be appropriate. 129
124. Id. Responding to the majority's fear of treating similarly situated parties
differently, Justice Blackmun stated, "Dissimilar treatment of litigants similarly
situated does occur, but in the manner opposite to that perceived by the Court.
Those who sue nationals of noncontracting States are disadvantaged by the una-
vailability of the Convention procedures. This is an unavoidable inequality inherent
in the benefits conferred by any treaty that is less than universally ratified." Id.
125. Id. at 2553.
126. Article 9 provides:
The judicial authority which executes a Letter of Request shall apply its
own law as to the methods and procedures to be followed.
However, it will follow a request of the requesting authority that a special
method or procedure be followed, unless this is incompatible with the internal
law of the State of execution or is impossible of performance by reason of
its internal, practice and procedure or by reason of practical difficulties.
The history of the provision shows that "incompatible with" is not to be read to
allow a nation to disregard the special request unless a clear and direct conflict with
internal law exists. Report of the United States Delegation, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATEILS,
at 810.
127. Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad, Article 10, 23 U.S.T. at
2561.
128. Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad, Article 5, 23 U.S.T. at
2560.
129. 107 S. Ct. at 2562. In a situation such as this, the failure of the
Convention's procedures may indicate that the political balancing of sovereign
interests which the treaty represents has become skewed. This may provide justifi-
cation for an American court to apply a traditional comity analysis and use
compulsion or sanction a party under FED. R. Cirv. P. 37. Id. Such measures,
however, may not be available to an American court in regards to a non-party
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Finally, the majority assumes that the procedures of the Convention
will be "unduly time consuming and expensive, as well as less certain
to produce needed evidence than the direct use of the Federal
Rules". 130 The Court offers no support for this statement and the
record discloses only one such admittedly "atypical" occurence.131
The available evidence supports the conclusion that the treaty operates
satisfactorily3 2 and, although it does not appear to have been used
sufficiently to make a conclusive determination, 33 the treaty's history
discloses that it was designed to operate quickly and cheaply. 3 4 The
majority acknowledges that there will be times when more evidence
can be obtained more quickly under the procedures of the Hague
Convention,'35 however, they fail to provide any reasons for this
belief that some instances of discovery are better suited for the
provisions of the treaty than others.
In light of the historical reluctance of American litigants to use
the procedures of the Hague Convention when conducting discovery
abroad, the practical effect of the decision in Societe Nattionale will
most likely be to provide a justification for the continued disregard
witness over whom it has no jurisdiction. See supra note 95. Further, the minority
stated:
When there is a conflict, a court should seek a reasonable accomodation
that reconciles the central concerns of both sets of laws. In doing so, it should
perform a tripartite analysis that considers foreign interests, the interests of
the United States, and the mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly
functioning regime.
107 S. Ct. at 2562.
130. Id. at 2555.
131. Id. at 2556 n.20. Justice Blackmun also noted that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not always operate inexpensively. Id. at 2565.
132. Boyd, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 119, 134 (1978). Quoting a United States Department
of Justice memo, Boyd states:
Our experience with the Evidence Convention has been extremely grati-
fying. In all respects, the Convention appears to be a great step forward in
the area of international judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters.
1d.
133. Id. Records show that between October 1,1976 and September 1, 1977
the Justice Department executed 74 requests for evidence pursuant to the Hague
Convention from signatory and non-signatory nations despite the availability of the
more liberal federal discovery procedures. Id. Up until 1979 it appears that less than
25 Letters of Request were dispatched by American litigants. Borel & Boyd, supra
note 98, at 45.
134. Report of the United States Delegation, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, at
806; Report on the Second Meeting of the Special Commission, 24 INT'L LEGAL
MATERLAS, at 1670.
135. 107 S. Ct. at 2555 n.26.
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of the treaty. The Court's comity analysis, based upon a built-in
pro-forum bias, largely ensures that the provisions of the Convention
will seldom be used and continues the American affront to foreign
sovereignty known as legal tourism. Although change may be had
through diplomatic channels or unilaterally by Congress or foreign
governments, the limited appellate review of discovery orders all but
ensures that the decision will remain virtually unassailable in Amer-
ica's courts. Foreign acquiescence to American discovery orders is
likely to continue, but as Justice Blackmun noted, it may "carry a
pricetag of accumulating resentment, with the predictable long-term
political cost that cooperation will be withheld in other matters. Use
of the Convention is a simple step to take toward avoiding that
unnecessary and undesirable consequence.
'136
Michael P. Lehutsky
136. Id. at 2568.
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